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THE IMPASSE DOCTRINE
PETER GUYON EARLE
I. INTRODUCTION
The impasse doctrine in collective bargaining allows limited unilat-
eral action by an employer when a good-faith deadlock in negotiations is
reached between the employer and the union on mandatory subjects of
bargaining.' The impasse doctrine is most frequently used by the em-
ployer as a defense against the union's charge that the employer refused
to bargain in good faith 2 in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 3 The doctrine is a judicial invention used
to reconcile the dual mandate of the NLRA. The NLRA simultaneously
requires the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) to en-
force a duty to bargain in good faith but prohibits the Board from com-
pelling the parties to enter agreements or make concessions. 4  The
tension between these two legislative mandates has resulted in two dis-
tinct forms of impasse doctrine. The traditional view is that impasse is a
tool to promote the bargaining process; the more recent view sees im-
passe as a terminal point of the bargaining process. The case law has not
made this distinction explicit, but it is evident in both the manner and
outcome of the Board's treatment of the doctrine.
The traditional view of the impasse doctrine is that a principal ob-
jective of the NLRA is the protection of the collective bargaining pro-
1. Huck Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 693 F.2d 1176, 1186 (5th Cir. 1982). The National Labor Rela-
tions Act requires that an employer and the exclusive representative of the employees negotiate with
each other regarding terms and conditions of employment within certain prescribed periods. Such
negotiations must be a good faith effort to reach a collective bargaining agreement. Those matters
that constitute terms and conditions of employment are generally referred to as mandatory subjects
of bargaining. Unilateral action commonly refers to unilaterally imposed changes in terms and con-
ditions of employment absent an agreement between the parties. E.g. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp.
v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-75 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Huck, 693 F.2d at 1186; Gulf States Mfg. v. NLRB, 704 F.2d 1390 (5th Cir.
1983).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5); see also § 8(d) of the NLRA which provides:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negoti-
ation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obliga-
tion does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a conces-
sion ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
4. NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472, 482 (5th Cir. 1963).
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cess.5 When negotiations reach a stalemate, the legislative mandate to
enforce the duty to bargain is limited by the prohibition of compelled
agreements. 6 In this situation, the traditional view seeks to further the
bargaining process by allowing the employer to act unilaterally and
thereby increase the likelihood that the impasse will be broken by this use
of economic force.7 It is only when the deadlock is such that further
negotiations would be futile that the prohibition of compelled agreements
and the requirement of collective bargaining collide. Thus, the tradi-
tional approach to impasse logically requires that the option of limited
unilateral action by the employer be predicated upon objective evidence
of futility.8
In contrast, the more recent view of the impasse doctrine treats the
bargaining process as a subjective limitation on the employer's en-
trepreneurial property rights, ostensibly only to the extent necessary to
maintain industrial peace.9 Not only will an impasse be declared when
further negotiations are determined to be futile, but also when, in the
opinion of the Board, the "economic necessity" of the employer justifies
unilateral action.10 Thus, use of the more recent view allows an impasse
to exist in a wider variety of situations, thereby making it easier for the
employer to resort safely to unilateral action. This effect has increased
5. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) ("The theory of the Act is
that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to pro-
mote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself
does not attempt to compel."). It is also instructive that as early as 1934, the United States Supreme
Court noted that: "The legislative history of the Act goes far to indicate that the purpose of the
statute was to compel employers to bargain collectively with their employes to the end that employ-
ment contracts binding on both parties should be made." NLRB v. Sands Mfg., 306 U.S. 332, 342
(1939). See also Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
6. Huck, 693 F.2d at 1187.
7. Hi-Way Billboards, 206 N.L.R.B. 22, 23 (1973).
Thus, a genuine impasse is akin to a hiatus in negotiations. In the overall ongoing process
of collective bargaining, it is merely a point at which the parties cease to negotiate and
often resort to forms of economic persuasion to establish the primacy of their negotiating
position .... Therefore, it is clear that an impasse is but one thread in the complex tapestry
of collective bargaining, rather than a bolt of a different hue. In short, a genuine impasse is
not the end of collective bargaining.
E.g. Inta-Roto, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 764, 767-68 (1980); Northwestern Dodge Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 877,
886 (1981) (citing Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., 243 N.L.R.B. 1093 (1979)).
8. NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d at 482. It is the fact of deadlock that is significant.
9. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678-79 (1981). "Management must
be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a
profitable business." (footnote omitted) Note that this statement was made in the context of defining
what constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining.
10. E.g., Dahl Fish Co. Seapac, 279 N.L.R.B. No. 150 slip op. at 2 n.3 (May 23, 1986) (The
issue of wages is particularly susceptible to resolution under collective bargaining and the presence of
changed economic circumstances does not diminish this approach. "To find otherwise would let a
turn in economic circumstances permit an employer ... [to] unilaterally implement such wage rates
completely obviating the efficacy of collective bargaining." Id. at 44.); Eagle Express Co., 273
N.L.R.B. 501, 506-07 (1984).
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employer discretion relative to the duty to bargain. I I
This recent view of the impasse doctrine improperly subordinates
the duty to bargain to the economic needs of the employer. Further-
more, the resulting increase in employer discretion in exercising the duty
to bargain contravenes the legislative intent underlying the NLRA and is
equivalent to an impermissible administrative judicial amendment of the
Act.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The case law has not precisely defined the labor law concept of im-
passe.' 2 The dictionary defines an impasse as "a situation that has no
solution or affords no escape."' 3 The cases following the traditional view
use various definitions; however, most require that the parties have bar-
gained in good faith and have reached a deadlock that would make any
further bargaining futile. t4 A number of key cases reflecting the more
recent view of impasse make findings as to its existence, yet neglect to
offer a definition of the doctrine. 15 Those that do offer a definition tend
to define impasse consistently with the traditional view, but they use the
11. Dahl, 279 N.L.R.B. No. 150 slip op. at 44.
12. Heller, Unilateral Action in a Concession Bargaining Context, 35 LAB. L.J. 747, 754 (1984);
Murphy, Impasse and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 39 U. Prr. L. REV. 1, 2 (1977); Stewart &
Engeman, Impasse, Collective Bargaining and Action, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 233, 241 (1970).
13. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 911 (2d. ed. 1979).
14. See NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472, 482 (5th Cir. 1968) (impasse is "a state of facts
in which the parties, despite the best of faith, are simply deadlocked"); Hi-Way Billboards, 206
N.L.R.B. 22, 23 (1973):
A genuine impasse in negotiations is synonymous with a deadlock: the parties have dis-
cussed a subject or subjects in good faith, and, despite their best efforts to achieve agree-
ment with respect to such, neither party is willing to move from its respective position.
When such a deadlock is reached between the parties, the duty to bargain about the subject
matter of the impasse merely becomes dormant until changed circumstances indicate that
an agreement may be possible.
(footnote omitted); see also Excavation-Constr., 248 N.L.R.B. 649, 650 (1980) ("A genuine impasse
in negotiations exists when, despite the parties' best efforts to achieve an agreement, neither party is
willing to move from its position. Until the collective bargaining process had been exhausted, no
impasse can occur."); NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 582 F.2d 135, 147 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979) (Exhaustive bargaining occurred where there was " 'no
realistic prospect that continuation of discussion at time would have been fruitful,' which is a work-
ing definition of impasse.") (quoting American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 129
U.S. 399, 405 (1968)); Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967) (impasse exists after
"good-faith negotiations have exhausted the prospects of concluding and agreement"); Dallas Gen-
eral Drivers v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 842, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("Where good faith bargaining has not
resolved a key issue and where there are no definite plans for further efforts to break the deadlock,
the Board is warranted ... and perhaps sometimes even required ... to make a determination that
an impasse existed.").
15. Browning-Ferris Indus., 275 N.L.R.B. 71 (1985); Bell Transit Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 1272,
1273 (1984), enf't denied, Teamsters Local Union No. 175 v. NLRB, 788 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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doctrine very differently. 16 Therefore, how the doctrine is defined is of
limited value in understanding the more recent approach to the function
and effect of the doctrine.
By 1943, the case law had established the general rule
that the obligation to bargain collectively, within the meaning of the
act, forbids unilateral action... with respect to ... [mandatory sub-
jects]... during the existence of a contract or the pendency of negotia-
tions embracing those subjects, even where, as in some cases, such
unilateral action is to the benefit of the employees .... 17
Within two decades, as a result of the landmark case of NLRB v.
Katz,18 the pre-impasse prohibition of unilateral action became an un-
equivocally accepted per se doctrine.' 9 In Katz, the employer imple-
mented various unilateral actions while negotiating an initial contract
with the union.20 The employer defended section 8(a)(5) charges on two
grounds, claiming, first, that the unilateral changes had been imple-
mented after an impasse had been reached and, second, that unilateral
action alone, without a finding of subjective bad faith at the bargaining
table, was insufficient to support a section 8(a)(5) violation. 2t With re-
gard to the first defense, the Court did not disturb the NLRB's finding
that no impasse had occurred prior to the unilateral actions.22 Regard-
ing the second defense, the Court held that a general failure of subjective
good faith was not required in order for the duty to bargain to be
breached. 23 The Court went on to assert "that an employer's unilateral
change in conditions of employment under negotiation is ... a violation
of § 8(a)(5), for it is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frus-
trates the objectives of § 8(a)(5) much as does a flat refusal."' 24
16. See. e.g., SGS Control Servs., 275 N.L.R.B. 984, 987 (1985); E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1984).
17. Annotation, What amounts to "collective bargaining" within National Labor Relations Act,
147 A.L.R. 7, 47 (1943). For a comprehensive list of early cases proscribing unilateral action by the
employer, see id. at 48.
18. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
19. Murphy, supra note 12, at 23.
20. 369 U.S. at 741. The employer was charged specifically with violating § 8(a)(5) by "unilat-
erally granting numerous merit increases in October 1956 and January 1957, unilaterally announcing
a change in sick-leave policy in March 1957; and unilaterally instituting a new system of automatic
wage increases during April 1957." Negotiations had begun on August 30, 1956 and continued
through May 13, 1957. Id. at 739-41.
21. Id. at 741-42.
22. Id. "According to the Board, however, 'the evidence is clear that the Respondent under-
took its unilateral actions before negotiations were discontinued in May 1957, or before, as we find
on the record, the existence of any possible impasse.' There is ample support in the record consid-
ered as a whole for this finding of fact . (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 743.
24. Id. In closing, the United States Supreme Court also stated: "Unilateral action by an em-
ployer without prior discussion with the union does amount to a refusal to negotiate about the
[Vol. 64:407
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The discussion of impasse in Katz did not include either a definition
of the doctrine or a specification of the criteria by which the presence or
absence of impasse is to be determined. 25 However, the Court implicitly
affirmed the rule that a bona fide impasse reached after good faith negoti-
ations is a valid defense to section 8(a)(5) charges stemming from post-
impasse unilateral action.26
III. DETERMINATION OF IMPASSE: THE TAFT FACTORS
In Katz, the United States Supreme Court characterized a state of
impasse as "inherently inconsistent with a continued willingness to nego-
tiate" and implied that identification of the existence of an impasse was
essential to a determination of whether the duty to bargain continues to
bar unilateral action. 27 Five years after Katz, the Board confronted in
Taft Broadcasting28 the task of developing a principled approach to the
identification of a state of impasse.
In Taft, the Board first enunciated specific factors for determining
the existence of a state of impasse. These factors include (1) the bargain-
ing history, (2) the good faith of the parties in negotiations, (3) the length
of negotiations, (4) the importance of the issues over which there is disa-
greement, and (5) the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as
to the state of negotiations. 29 These factors were designed to determine
whether further bargaining would be futile. 30 The five Taft factors have
subsequently been cited in almost every case where a determination is
made as to the existence of impasse.31
Taft involved a successor employer who was bargaining for the first
affected conditions of employment under negotiation, and must of necessity obstruct bargaining,
contrary to the congressional policy." Id. at 747.
25. Id. See Williamsburg Steel Prod. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 288 (1960).
26. 369 U.S. at 745 ("But even after an impasse is reached he [the employer] has no license to
grant wage increases greater than any he has ever offered the union at the bargaining table, or such
action is necessarily inconsistent with a sincere desire to conclude an agreement with the union.").
The implication here is that if the post-impasse unilateral action is comprehended within pre-im-
passe proposals there is no per se inconsistency with a sincere desire to conclude an agreement.
27. Id. at 741 n.7.
28. 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967), enforced sub nom American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists
v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
29. Id. at 478.
30. Id. An impasse was defined as existing "after good faith negotiations have exhausted the
prospects of concluding an agreement."
31. NLRB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., 639 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980), aff'd, 454 U.S. 404
(1982); George Banta Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 1197 (1981); Southern Newspapers, 246 N.L.R.B. 39
(1979); Allen W. Bird II, 227 N.L.R.B. 1355, 1357 (1977); Times Herald Printing Co., 221 N.L.R.B.
225, 228-29 (1975); Columbia Records, 207 N.L.R.B. 993, 1003 (1973). The Taft factors have also
been cited as the basis for determining the existence of impasse even in cases which reflect the more
recent view of impasse as a terminal point of the bargaining process triggered by considerations other
than futility of further bargaining. Eg., Bell Transit Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 1272 (1984). But several
1988]
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time with an incumbent union.32 After more than twenty-three bargain-
ing sessions, the parties had not made perceptible progress on the em-
ployees' demands that the new contract allow for substantially greater
flexibility in the assignment of employees and various other basic conces-
sions.3 3 As a result, the employer decided unilaterally to implement its
changes. 34  The Board held that the parties had reached an impasse
before the employer enacted unilateral changes and therefore dismissed
the union's section 8(a)(5) suit. 35 The Board emphasized the factors of
good faith, length of negotiations, importance of the issues and contem-
poraneous understanding of the parties, but disregarded bargaining his-
tory, despite having listed it as a factor.
36
Courts using both the traditional and the more recent views of the
impasse doctrine have continued to apply the five Taft factors, often in
checklist fashion.37 However, both the manner and outcome of that ap-
plication indicate divergent views of the importance and role of the duty
to bargain within the congressionally established framework for labor-
management relations. What follows is a brief survey of the traditional
and more recent applications of each factor.
A. , Bargaining History
"Bargaining history" has been treated as the least consequential of
the Taft factors. As demonstrated by its treatment in Taft Broadcasting,
this factor is most commonly simply listed in a routine recitation of the
standards, after which a determination as to the existence of impasse is
made based on application of the other four factors. 38 Further, in Taft
Broadcasting, the Board gave no indication of just how this factor was to
be applied, nor of its significance in determining whether a state of im-
passe occurred. 39 In subsequent cases, however, the Board has applied
recent cases that dramatically expand the scope of impasse beyond futility do not approve of Taft.
See Walter A. Zlogar, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1986); Eagle Express Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 501 (1984).
32. 163 N.L.R.B. at 475. Beyond a passing reference to the fact, the Board did not focus on or
discuss application of the "'bargaining history" factor.
33. Id. at 475, 476, 478. The employer demanded complete interchangeability between catego-
ries of personnel and between broadcasting media. The old collective bargaining agreement imposed
substantial limitations on the employer's ability to interchange personnel. Also, the employer de-
manded the right to use pre-recorded broadcasts without limitation. Other key issues included
wages and use of supervisory personnel for broadcasting activity other than editorial broadcasting.
34. Id. at 477.
35. Id. at 478.
36. Id.
37. See supra note 31.
38. E.g., Dahl Fish Co. Seapac, 279 N.L.R.B. No. 150, slip op. at 37 (May 23, 1986); Coalite,
Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 293, 301-03 (1986); TKB Int'l Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. 1082, 1083 n.8 (1979).
39. 163 N.L.R.B. at 478.
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this factor in two distinct ways. 40
One of the most prevalent and potentially useful applications of
"bargaining history" has been as an aid to the evaluation of other Taft
factors, most notably the "good faith of the parties."'4' In San Diego Van
& Storage Co. ,42 the bargaining history of the parties was used to docu-
ment an "exemplary" relationship between the parties as evidence of the
employer's good faith. Despite the fact that only one negotiating session
had been held, a valid impasse was found to exist.43 This impasse ex-
cused the employer's unilateral change in operations which forced em-
ployees to choose between entering independent contractor agreements
or losing their jobs.44 Similarly, in Times Herald Printing Co. ,45 the bar-
gaining history of the parties was used to defeat a union allegation of
employer bad faith in bargaining. In that case, the union alleged that the
employer's failure to put certain proposals in writing constituted evi-
dence of bad faith, thereby precluding a bona fide impasse prior to the
unilateral action.46 In finding a valid impasse, the Board noted that the
parties' bargaining history indicated that normally only the original bar-
gaining proposals of each party were submitted in writing. Therefore,
the employer's conduct was consistent with past practice and accordingly
not indicative of bad faith.47
Another prevalent application of bargaining history has been to use
the length of time over which the union and employer have sustained a
successful collective bargaining relationship as an indicator of the exist-
ence of an impasse.48 Where the parties have had a long collective bar-
gaining relationship, the Board is likely to use that fact as being
40. A third somewhat aberrational application of bargaining history is evident where bargain-
ing history is in effect used interchangeably with length of negotiations. See Richmond Recording
Corp., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 77, slip op. at 40 (June 24, 1986); Deister Concentrator Co., 253 N.L.R.B.
358, 395-96 (1980).
41. See Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 204 N.L.R.B. 83, 87 (1973) ("There is no evi-
dence that Respondent ... was motivated in any way by animus against the Union or engaged in
bad-faith bargaining. To the contrary, the parties, with a long history of bargaining have maintained
excellent relations."); Hartz-Kirkpatrick Constr. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 863, 867 (1972) ("Here there is
no claim that any of the parties had not bargained in good faith and the history of past bargaining
which culminated in the earlier 1967 contract would believe any such suggestion.").
42. 236 N.L.R.B. 701 (1978).
43. Id. at 705.
44. Id. at 702, 703, 705.
45. 221 N.L.R.B. 225 (1975).
46. Id. at 228 n.7.
47. Id. The NLRB also noted that the parties had a sixty-year bargaining history and that this
was the first time that they had been unable to reach an agreement. After noting this fact, the
NLRB asserted that there was no evidence that the employer did not intend to reach an agreement.
Id. at 229.
48. Murphy, supra note 12, at 8.
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supportive of an impasse finding.49 On the other hand, where the parties
are involved for the first time in the negotiation of an initial collective
bargaining agreement, the Board will generally not consider that fact as
supportive of an impasse finding.
In Seattle-First National Bank,50 the Board considered whether an
impasse had been reached before the employer unilaterally implemented
its "final" offer. 51 In applying the Taft factors in checklist fashion, the
Board noted that the parties had a bargaining relationship of at least ten
years and had entered into two prior three-year contracts. 52 The Board
then concluded that such a bargaining history favored a finding of im-
passe. After considering the other factors, the Board decided that a valid
impasse had indeed been reached prior to the unilateral action and dis-
missed the complaint in its entirety. 5
Similarly, in Alsey Refractories Co. ,54 the Board applied the Taft fac-
tors in checklist fashion in determining whether an impasse had been
reached prior to a unilateral wage increase. 55 The Board found that no
valid impasse had been reached and noted that "the parties were engaged
in their first experience in bargaining .. and their efforts to achieve a
contract should be afforded the fullest opportunity.
'5 6
Logic would seem to credit the rule as expressed in Alsey Refrac-
tories Co. as it relates to initial bargaining experiences. However, a
mechanical application of the inverse idea that an extensive bargaining
history tends to support a finding of impasse would seem to lack sub-
stance and be of little value in aiding a determination of impasse. This
application fails to aid the Board in gaining insight into the past practices
49. Id. But cf. Excavation-Constr., 248 N.L.R.B. 649, 650, 654 (1980) (despite a bargaining
history of eleven years no impasse was found).
50. 267 N.L.R.B. 897 (1983).
51. Id. at 898. In Seattle-First National Bank, 241 N.L.R.B. 753 (1979), the NLRB had found
that the employer violated § 8(a)(5) by failing to bargain in good faith and implementing portions of
its final offer before reaching a valid impasse. The Ninth Circuit subsequently denied enforcement in
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 1221 (1981). The court found that bad faith bargaining
could not be solely based on the employer's proposals, but rather must be based on a substantial
showing that the employer's attitude was not consistent with its duty to seek an agreement. Id. at
1226. In remanding the court instructed that if there was no finding of bad faith, the NLRB was to
determine if the parties had reached a bona fide impasse before the employer undertook unilateral
action. Id. at 1227.
52. 267 N.L.R.B. at 898.
53. Id. at 898, 899. In Financial Institution Employees v. NLRB, 738 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir.
1984) the court denied the petition for review of the Board's finding of impasse.
54. 215 N.L.R.B. 785 (1974).
55. Id. at 786-87.
56. Id. at 786. Eg., Saunders House, 265 N.L.R.B. 1632, 1634 (1982), enf't denied, 719 F.2d
683 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984) (where parties are negotiating an initial agree-
ment, the bargaining history does not favor a finding of impasse where the Board found that the
employer violated § 8(a)(5)).
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of the parties.57
B. Good Faith
Good faith in bargaining is a fundamental requirement of the NLRB
as specified in section 8(d) and as enforced by section 8(a)(5) and section
8(b)(3). 58 In fact, a lack of good faith in bargaining may be an independ-
ent violation of section 8(a)(5). Thus, the question of its existence may
arise in numerous situations in which impasse is not an issue. However,
this Note will discuss good faith in bargaining only in the context of the
Taft analysis as used to determine whether the parties have reached an
impasse. In this sense, good faith, while not dispositive, is a prerequisite
to a finding of a valid impasse.59 The existence of good faith in bargain-
ing has to do with whether a party has the intent to settle differences and
arrive at an agreement. 60 Thus, a determination of whether a party is
truly bargaining in good faith is often a subjective inquiry and, as one
commentator recently noted, is one of the most difficult of all
adjudications.
61
Certain conduct has been held to be indicative of a lack of good
faith. The Board has listed such conduct as including "delaying tactics,
unreasonable bargaining demands, unilateral changes in mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining, efforts to bypass the union, failure to designate an
agent with sufficient bargaining authority, withdrawal of already agreed
upon provisions, and arbitrary scheduling of meetings."
'62
The cases in which the presence or absence of good faith in bargain-
ing had bearing on the existence of a valid impasse can be divided into
two groups. The first includes those cases in which there exists some
objective indicator of the presence or absence of good faith; i.e., overt
conduct. The second consists of those cases where the inference as to the
presence or absence of good faith is drawn from the reasonableness of the
proposals or bargaining positions of the parties. The following discussion
57. In both Lou Stecher's Super Markets, 275 N.L.R.B. 475 (1985), and Bell Transit Co., 271
N.L.R.B. 1272 (1984), the Board, in accord with its more recent view of the impasse doctrine,
mechanically credited an extensive bargaining history as supportive of an impasse finding without
any regard for the content of that extensive bargaining history.
58. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
59. E.g., NLRB v. Big Three Indus., 497 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974).
60. NLRB v. Wonder State Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 210, 215 (8th Cir. 1965); Taft Broadcasting,
163 N.L.R.B. at 478; Akron Novelty Mfg. Co., 224 N.L.R.B. 998, 1001 (1976).
61. DiGiovanni, Surface v. Hard Bargaining: Tilting Toward Nonintervention, 2 LAB. LAW.
771 (1986). See also Abingdon Nursing Center, 197 N.L.R.B. 781, 787 (1972) (question of whether
employer is bargaining with a sincere desire to arrive at an agreement is "oft times a conundrum
which has plagued the Board and Courts [sic] in the past").
62. ACL Corp., 214 N.L.R.B. 1600, 1603 (1984).
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of the case law reveals that recent Board treatment of this factor in each
of the two groups has served to increase employer discretion as to the
duty to bargain by making it easier for employers to declare impasse.
Within the first group, the more overt and readily observable actions
of the parties aimed at avoiding bargaining continue to be consistently
viewed by the Board as indicative of impasse. Thus, delaying tactics by
the union were cited as justification for unilateral action before impasse
in M & M Building & Electrical Contractors.63 In affirming the adminis-
trative law judge's finding that such unilateral action did not violate sec-
tion 8(a)(5), Board members Fanning and Zimmerman nevertheless
noted that, before imposing such unilateral action, an employer generally
should be required first to demonstrate its diligence and good faith by
presenting the union with a detailed contract proposal and then allowing
the union a reasonable time to evaluate the proposal. 64
In Crane Co. ,65 the Board held that delaying tactics by an employer
take on special significance when they occur toward the end of a period
of limitations: "Slowness in responding to a bargaining demand, in sup-
plying information, or in agreeing to a date for negotiations can mean
one thing when a certification is fresh and quite another thing when the
certification is growing stale. '" 66 Thus, the context of the delaying tactic
is of crucial significance to the issue of good faith.
The divergence between the two views of impasse relative to overt
evidence of bad faith bargaining becomes most evident in cases involving
continuing unremedied unfair labor practices. Generally, under the
traditional view, the good faith bargaining requirement will preclude a
valid impasse where the employer has committed a continuing unremed-
ied unfair labor practice. 67 Nevertheless, in NLRB v. Cauthorne68 the
District of Columbia Circuit considered the scope of make-whole reme-
dies available in a case where an impasse may have occurred in bargain-
ing that followed more than six months after an unlawful and
unremedied unilateral action. 69 The court stated that while an unlawful
63. 262 N.L.R.B. 1472 (1982).
64. Id. Cf. AAA Motor Lines, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 793, 794 (1974).
65. 244 N.L.R.B. 103 (1979).
66. Id. at 110. In Crane, the delaying tactics included delays in scheduling meetings, delays in
furnishing information use of a negotiator without authority. Such tactics were noted to be "strong
evidence of bad faith in meeting one's obligation to bargain." Id. at 110- 1l.
67. 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 637 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1984).
68. 691 F.2d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 1024. Upon expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, the employer indicated
that he would not sign another contract. Then, after several unproductive meetings, the employer
terminated payments to the union's pension fund. More than six months later, the parties had one
unproductive meeting and thereafter exchanged proposals for a new contract by mail. In finding a
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unilateral change by the employer constituted "some evidence concern-
ing the good faith of his subsequent overtures, [it] is not dispositive."
70
Thus, the court explicitly rejected any presumption that an employer's
unfair labor practice would automatically preclude the possibility of
meaningful negotiations and prevent the parties from reaching a valid
impasse. 71 In addition, the court implicitly held that where a valid im-
passe is reached after a unilateral change, it will mark the end of the
period for which back pay may be awarded.
72
In Dependable Building Maintenance Co.,73 the NLRB, in accord
with the more recent view, relied on Cauthorne in rejecting the argument
that no impasse could exist where the employer's unremedied unfair la-
bor practices "hung over the bargaining."' 74 In that case, a pre-impasse
unilateral action by the employer, which was found to violate section
8(a)(5), was followed by one meeting between the parties. 75 Then two
and one-half months after the continuing unfair labor practice had been
committed, what was declared to be a valid impasse occurred because the
union had failed to "make any significant economic proposals which
went to the heart of the dispute."
'76
Similarly, in Eagle Express Co. ,77 the Board first held that the em-
ployer's initial unilateral reduction of wages violated section 8(a)(5).
78
Then, three months before the unlawful unilateral action, the parties met
four times. During these four meetings, the employer demanded that the
new contract include exactly the same wages it had earlier unilaterally
established. 79 In a display of questionable logic, the Board held that the
parties reached a valid impasse and therefore the employer was free to
"implement" the very wage reduction he had already unlawfully imple-
§ 8(a)(5) violation, the Board ordered a make-whole remedy requiring the employer to make all
health and welfare fund contributions required by the expired contract until a new contract was
negotiated. In an opinion by Judge Edwards the court held that the parties "may" have reached an
impasse at some point during the time in which they were exchanging proposals by mail and there-
fore remanded the case for the Board to make such a determination and, if necessary, modify the
scope of the remedy. Id. at 1024-26.
70. Id. at 1026 n.5. But see NLRB v. Laredo Coca Cola Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 1338, 1343 n. 10
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980) ("[E]mployer's offer to discuss the possibility of re-
turning to prior job terms previously altered, unilaterally, does not mitigate the statutory violation
created by that previous unilateral change.").
71. 691 F.2d at 1025.
72. Id.
73. 276 N.L.R.B. 27 (1985).
74. Id. at 29.
75. Id. at 29-30.
76. Id. at 30. The A.L.J. characterized the union's bargaining conduct as "rigid" for failing to
make "concessions which would have avoided an impasse." Id.
77. 273 N.L.R.B. 501 (1984).
78. Id. at 501 n.3.
79. Id. at 506.
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mented. 80 A close reading of the case further reveals that a major factor
in the finding of impasse was the bargaining position of the union in hav-
ing rejected a contract which contained wage provisions exactly the same
as those that had already unlawfully been put into effect.81 In other
words, the union was, ironically, viewed by the Board as having in effect
engaged in surface bargaining over the continuation of an unremedied
unfair labor practice.
Under the more recent view of the impasse doctrine, the position of
the Board on the issue of surface bargaining as an indicator of bad faith
has undergone substantial revision in favor of the interests of manage-
ment. The issue of surface bargaining arises when, absent other overt
indicators of bad faith, the only source of inference as to the subjective
intent of the parties is the reasonableness of the proposals they advance. 82
In the often cited case of NLRB v. Reed & Prince Manufacturing Co. ,83
the court noted that "if the Board is not to be blinded by empty talk and
by the mere surface motions of collective bargaining, it must take some
cognizance of the reasonableness of the positions taken by the em-
ployer. ' '84 A number of cases since Reed & Prince have relied upon the
reasonableness of the employer's proposals in finding a lack of good
faith. 85 However, in Seattle-First National Bank v. NLRB, the court,
while sanctioning consideration of the content of bargaining proposals,
held that inferences drawn solely from the content of those proposals are
insufficient to support a finding of bad faith bargaining. 86 Caution by the
Board and the courts in considering inferences of bad faith drawn from
the bargaining proposals of the parties is based on the admonition of
section 8(d), which precludes the Board from compelling agreements or
concessions or otherwise sitting in judgment upon the substantive terms
80. Id.
81. Id. at 506 n.2.
82. NLRB v. Wright Motors, Inc., 603 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1979).
83. 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953), cited in Huck Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
693 F.2d 1176, 1188 (5th Cir. 1983); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 1221, 1227 (9th
Cir. 1981); Browning-Ferris Indus., 275 N.L.R.B. 71, 78-79 (1985); ACL Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. 1600,
1603 n.9 (1984); Abingdon Nursing Center, 197 N.L.R.B. 781, 787 (1972).
84. 205 F.2d at 134.
85. A-I King Size Sandwiches, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 850, 858 (1982) (unusually harsh and unrea-
sonable proposals may support a finding of bad faith bargaining); cf Glenmar Clinestate, Inc., 264
N.L.R.B. 236 (1982) ("[U]nder normal circumstances, the magnitude of the wage decrease proposed
... would be strong evidence of bad-faith bargaining."); K & K Transp. Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. 722,
736 (1981) ("[T]he nature of an employer's proposals are material factors in determining the em-
ployer's motivation. Thus, an intransigent position as to proposals which are predictably unaccept-
able to the Union may indicate a predetermination not to reach agreement.").
86. 638 F.2d 1221, 1226 (1981).
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of proposals.8 7
A particularly illustrative example of the application of the good
faith bargaining requirement in accord with the more recent view of the
impasse doctrine is Browning-Ferris Industries.88 In that case, the Board
found that the employer violated section 8(a)(1) by soliciting employees
to decertify the union in anticipation of the expiring contract's window
period. The violative actions included interrogating the employees about
their union sympathies and creating an impression among the employees
that their support for the union was futile. 89 The Board adopted the
A.L.J.'s conclusion that the employer "was motivated to and did attempt
to displace the Union." 90 Then, with two months until the expiration of
the contract, the union requested negotiations. However, the employer
did not meet with the union until the last twenty days. 91 During the five
bargaining sessions that ensued, the employer insisted on a "draconian"
package that included increasing the work week and substantially reduc-
ing wages. 92 The union, which had begun by demanding a wage increase
and retention of the original work week, made concessions at each suc-
cessive bargaining session, until at the last meeting it dropped demands
for a wage increase and agreed to a wage plan calculated in a manner
proposed by the employer. 93 Further, at each of the last four meetings,
the union requested that the employer agree to extend the expiring con-
tract in case they were unable to reach agreement in time.94 At the last
meeting, the employer was credited with responding to the union that if
they did not have a contract by the expiration of the existing contract,
later that day, then the employees would be out on the streets, and no
one was going to have a job. 95 The Board held that, notwithstanding the
unremedied unfair labor practices, the employer had bargained in good
faith and that a valid impasse had been reached at the expiration of the
old contract, thereby having freed the employer to implement its "draco-
87. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952). See also supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
88. 275 N.L.R.B. 71 (1985).
89. Id. at 74. The Board further adopted the A.L.J.'s conclusion that "[g]etting rid of both
those wage scales and their cause-the Union-was at the top of his [the employer's] list." Id.
90. Id. at 80. Cf. Akron Novelty Mfg. Co., 224 N.L.R.B. 998, 1001 (1976).
91. 275 N.L.R.B. at 80. The A.L.J. found that the union requested negotiations and was told
that the employer was not ready throughout the month of February, yet in the same paragraph he
concludes that "only speculation can lay the delay" at the employer's door.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 75-78. Not only was the amount of wages in dispute, but also the method by which
they were to be calculated.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 81. The Board approved the A.L.J.'s finding: "Indeed the 'in the streets' excited
utterance let the cat out of the bag, for it shows that [the employer] knew that by its holding fast a
strike would ensue that would allow the company to hire new drivers at a lower scale." Id. at 82.
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nian" package.96 In a footnote to the opinion, the Board Chairman
noted that he felt it was inappropriate for the Board to consider the rea-
sonableness of the bargaining proposals.97 At least one commentator has
concluded that under this view of the good faith bargaining requirement,
the Board "has severely narrowed the concept of surface bargaining and
removed any remaining practical vitality" that the doctrine may have
had.98
C. Length of Negotiations
The length of negotiations is clearly the most empirical of the five
Taft factors. Information as to the number of meetings between the par-
ties, the length of those meetings and the amount of time that passes
between the initiation of negotiations and their end is almost always
noted by the Board in one form or another when considering the ques-
tion of a bargaining impasse.99 The general rule has been that the more
meetings between the parties, the better the chance that an impasse will
be found. 100 In this regard, the length and duration of the negotiations is
an indicator of whether or not the bargaining has been sufficiently ex-
haustive to justify a finding of impasse. 101 In order for the negotiations
to be sufficiently exhaustive, there should be opportunity for continuous
give and take even when the initial positions are far apart. 0 2
The Board, however, has held that this factor is not controlling103
The case law clearly bears this out, as evidenced by the seemingly ran-
96. Id. at 80-82.
97. Id. at 71 n.2. Chairman Dotson has also asserted this position in the following cases: Wal-
ter A. Zlogar, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1089 n.1 (1986); Hedaya Bros., Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 942, 945
n.19 (1985); Allbritton Communications, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 201, 205, n.13 (1984), aff'd, 766 F.2d
812 (3d. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986). Chairman Dotson relied on Struthers Wells
Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 1983) for this position. In that case, the court held that
by finding bad faith in lawful proposals the Board improperly injected itself into the bargaining
process in violation of § 8(d). But in that case the court held the proposals to be not "beyond the
bounds of reasonable bargaining," thus implying some consideration of their content. Id.
98. See Axelrod, The Dotson Board, Good Faith Bargaining, and the Duty to Substantiate One's
Bargaining Position, 2 LAB. LAW. 751, 752 (1986). See also DiGiovanni, supra note 61, at 789.
99. See, e.g., Joey's Stables, 279 N.L.R.B. No. 97, slip op. at 2 (April 30, 1986) (five meetings
occurring between January and May of 1984); Saunders House, 265 N.L.R.B. 1632 (1982) (noted
that a total of 17 meetings occurred over a seven-month period); Inta-Roto, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 764,
768 (1980) (noted that only four meetings occurred during an eleven-day period lasting a total of no
more than four hours of face to face discussion); Alsey Refractories Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 785, 786
(1974) (noted that only four meetings had occurred, only lasting 20 minutes during a six-month
period).
100. Richmond Recording Corp., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 77, slip op. at 33 (June 24, 1986).
101. See Patrick & Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 390, 393 (1980); Alsey Refractories Co., 215 N.L.R.B. at
786 (1974); Servis Equip. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 266, 269 (1972).
102. Carpenter Sprinkler Corp. v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir, 1979).
103. Coalite, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 293 (1986); Richmond Recording Corp., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 77,
slip op. at 33.
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dom assortment of findings as to the existence of impasse and corre-
sponding lengths of negotiations. 10 4 For example, impasse has been
found after only one negotiating session, 105 while no impasse has been
found after as many as eighteen sessions.106 Under the traditional view,
the disparity in the application of this factor can be explained by deter-
mining whether all the issues of importance were actually discussed by
the parties. Thus, in Saunders House,10 7 the Board found no impasse
after seventeen bargaining sessions over a six-month period. 08 In part,
the finding of no impasse rested on the fact that, while there were many
negotiating sessions, they were not exhaustive because the discussion was
limited on the "crucial question of wages."' 1 9 Thus, in order for the
length of negotiations to be indicative of impasse, this factor should be
reflective of sufficient opportunity for exhaustive bargaining over the is-
sues that in the particular case would be considered important to the
parties. 110
D. The Importance of the Issues as to Which There is a Disagreement
The fourth Taft factor is "the importance of the issue or issues as to
which there is disagreement." '  As a threshold matter, this factor re-
quires that the issues over which the parties disagree be important issues
in order for a resulting deadlock to constitute a valid impasse."l 2 Indeed,
in Taft the Board held in effect that a deadlock on one critical issue can
be of sufficient magnitude to cause a valid impasse. This is true even if
there is agreement or movement toward agreement on the other issues
104. See Hamady Bros. Food Mkts., 275 N.L.R.B. 1335, 1337 (1985) (impasse after 5 meetings);
Bell Transit Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 1272, 1273 (1984) (impasse after 3 meetings); Good GMC, Inc., 267
N.L.R.B. 583, 585 (1983) (no impasse after 2 meetings); R.A. Hatch Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1982)
(impasse after 2 meetings); Crest Beverage Co., 232 N.L.R.B. 116, 119 (1977), modified, 575 F.2d
661 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 1069 (1979) (no impasse after 4 meetings); Atlas Tack Co.,
226 N.L.R.B. 222, 227 (1976) (no impasse after 15 meetings); Akron Novelty Mfg. Co., 224
N.L.R.B. 998, 1000 (1976) (no impasse after 8 meetings); Taylor-Winfield Corp., 225 N.L.R.B. 457,
461 (1976) (impasse after 18 meetings).
105. See Dixon Distrib. Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 241, 244 (1974) (impasse found after one negotiating
session 20 minutes long); see also San Diego Van & Storage Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 701, 705 (1978)
(although an impasse was found after only three meetings, the A.L.J. also noted that the union's
inaction upon adequate notice could have "easily" justified the employer's reliance on the doctrine of
waiver).
106. SGS Control Servs., 275 N.L.R.B. 984 (1985).
107. 265 N.L.R.B. 1632 (1982).
108. Id. at 1634.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Patrick & Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 390, 393 (1980).
111. 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967).
112. See Dallas Gen. Drivers v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 842, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (definition of im-
passe requires deadlock on a key issue). See also Taylor-Winfield Corp., 225 N.L.R.B. 457, 461
(1976); Bill Cook Buick, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1095 (1976).
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because the deadlock may loom so large as to preclude any hope of arriv-
ing at a collective bargaining agreement.' 13 Therefore, under the tradi-
tional view, the "importance of the issues" may be significant to
determine whether a sufficient degree of latitude exists for continued bar-
gaining. If a deadlock has been reached on some issues but not on
others, then the possibility may exist that concessions or trade-offs on
these other issues could result in renewed movement on the deadlocked
issue. 114 In affirming Taft Broadcasting, the District of Columbia Circuit
stated that "even parties who seem to be in implacable conflict may, by
meeting and discussion, forge first small links and then strong bonds of
agreement." 11
5
In Saunders House v. NLRB, 116 the Third Circuit affirmed the view
that the "importance of the issues" was a crucial factor in determining
the degree of bargaining latitude that existed. 17 In that case, the court
asserted that the Board's finding of no impasse was flawed for failure to
take into account the importance of the issues over which there was disa-
greement."i8 The court found that the issues of wages, union security
and a dues checkoff provision were of such importance that the disagree-
ment over them crippled prospects of any agreement despite the finding
of the Board that the other factors indicated no impasse.' 19
The traditional approach to the use of the "importance of the is-
sues" factor is entirely faithful to an impasse doctrine whose purpose it is
to promote the duty to bargain. For, it is often by accurately determin-
ing the degree of bargaining latitude which may exist in negotiations that
the Board can determine whether further bargaining would be futile. In
NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills Inc.,120 the Supreme Court noted
that, had the employer continued negotiating rather than unilaterally in-
creasing wages, it would have presented "infinite opportunities for bar-
113. 163 N.L.R.B. at 478. ("[A] deadlock is still a deadlock whether produced by one or a
number of significant and unresolved differences in positions."). Accord NLRB v. Tomco Communi-
cations, Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 881 (9th Cir. 1978) (court found an impasse because a single issue
loomed so large as to "cripple the prospects of any agreement." The court noted that disagreement
on wages was central and irreconcilable so that "further discussion of grievance procedures would
have served no useful purpose."). See also Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 267 N.L.R.B. 897 (1983).
114. See NLRB v. Webb Furniture Corp., 366 F.2d 314, 316 (4th Cir. 1966); Patrick & Co., 248
N.L.R.B. 390, 393 (1980).
115. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 628 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
116. 719 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1983).
117. Id. at 687.
118. Id. at 688; see infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
119. 719 F.2d at 688-89. Cf NLRB v. Yamma Woodcraft, Inc., 580 F.2d 942,945 (9th Cir.
1978).
120. 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
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gaining."' 21 The Court added that, when faced with such bargaining
latitude, "it is difficult to infer an intent to cut off the opportunity for
bargaining and yet be consistent with the purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act." 
22
However, under the more recent view of the impasse doctrine, the
Board has strayed from this approach and has applied the "importance
of the issue" factor in a totally different way. The "importance of the
issues" has in some cases been equated with the economic necessity of the
employer. 23 In these cases, this Taft factor is not applied to determine
available latitude for further bargaining in the context of promoting the
collective bargaining process. Rather it is applied to determine whether
the employer is justified by economic necessity in foregoing his duty to
bargain without regard to the existence of futility.
In Bell Transit, 24 the Board relied heavily on what it called the
"supreme importance of the wage issue" in finding a valid impasse.' 25
The employer was a labor broker who provided trucking services to
Union Carbide, its sole customer. 126 In exchange for these services,
Union Carbide paid the employer a management fee and reimbursed it
for its labor costs. 127 Motivated by pressure from its sole customer to
reduce labor costs, the employer timely withdrew from a multi-employer
bargaining unit and initiated direct negotiations with the union. 128 After
just three bargaining sessions and while a tentative agreement was pend-
ing before the union's Eastern Conference, the employer unilaterally re-
duced wages.
129
Citing the parties' bargaining history of twenty-six years for sup-
port, the Board based its findings of impasse on the "importance of the
issue" factor.' 30 In applying this factor, the Board made no effort to
determine whether, because of the importance of wages, disagreement by
the parties on that issue provided so little bargaining latitude as to make
121. Id. at 224.
122. Id.
123. Bell Transit Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 1272 (1984), enf't denied, Teamsters Local Union No. 175
v. NLRB, 788 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Lou Stecher's Super Markets, 275 N.L.R.B. 475 (1985).
124. 271 N.L.R.B. 1272 (1984).
125. Id. at 1273.
126. Id. at 1272.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1273. In dismissing the other Taft factors, the Board noted that there was no dispute
as to good faith in negotiations, and that despite the limited number of bargaining sessions, no "rigid
formula" exists for the length of negotiations factor. Id. at 1273 n. 10. Finally the Board concocted a
bizarre justification for the final factor of contemporaneous understandings of the parties. See infra
note 153 and accompanying text.
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further bargaining futile. Rather, the Board chose to characterize the
issue as "compelling pressure," "overriding," and "supreme," and simply
concluded that the employer's continued corporate existence depended
on achieving reduced wages.' 3 ' The Board's use of this factor serves in
effect to release the employer from the duty to bargain if the employer
can provide sufficient evidence of business necessity. 132 The District of
Columbia Circuit on review conceded that the issue of wages was impor-
tant, but held that there was no indication that the centrality of this issue
meant that there was no bargaining latitude. 133 In a strongly worded
opinion, the court reversed the Board.1 34
E. The Contemporaneous Understanding of the Parties as to the State
of Negotiations
The fifth Taft factor is "the contemporaneous understanding of the
parties as to the state of negotiations."' 35 In Taft Broadcasting, the
Board applied this factor by focusing its attention on the final two ses-
sions between the parties prior to the employer's unilateral action. 36 As
a result, the Board concluded that each party "believed that . . . they
were further apart than when they had begun negotiations." 37 This con-
clusion as to the subjective belief of the parties was supported by the
objective evidence of the words and expressions used by them in negotia-
tions and by the direct testimony of the employer as to its beliefs at the
time.' 38 Thus, the Board concluded that the parties' understandings of
the state of negotiations at the time of the two meetings supported a find-
ing that a state of impasse existed.13 9
In Inta-Roto, Inc., 140 the Board noted that the "contemporaneous
understanding" aspect of the Taft analysis was the most difficult to re-
131. Id. at 1273.
132. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 534 (1983) (the policy of the NLRA, in
particular § 8(d), is "to protect the process of labor negotiations, not impose particular results on the
parties."). Cf. NLRB v. Manley Truck Line, Inc., 779 F.2d 1327, 1331 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The lan-
guage of § 8(d) neither expressly conditions its enforcement upon the continuing economic survival
of the employer's business, nor invites such a condition."). See also NLRB v. Laredo Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1980).
133. Teamster Local Union No. 175 v. NLRB, 788 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
134. Id.
135. 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967).
136. Id. at 476, 478. See also Atlas Tack Corp., 226 N.L.R.B. 222, 227 (1976), where the
A.L.J.'s determination that no impasse existed was predicated on an examination of the circum-
stances of October 22, the date of the bargaining session during which an impasse was alleged to
have arisen.
137. 163 N.L.R.B. at 478.
138. Id. at 476-77.
139. Id. at 478.
140. 252 N.L.R.B. 764 (1980).
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solve because it involves an objective finding as to the state of facts at the
time of the putative impasse as well as "a subjective attempt to discover
what was going on in the minds of the negotiators as they left the bar-
gaining table."' 14 ' The standard proposed in Inta-Roto was that the con-
temporaneous understandings of the parties should be compared to the
objective state of facts in order to determine if there existed "objective
evidence to warrant a belief that an impasse had been reached."' 42 Fur-
ther, the contemporaneous understanding of the parties was equated with
their "subjective feelings," and the salient question posed in this regard
was whether there remained a "'ray of hope with a real potentiality for
agreement if explored in good faith in bargaining sessions.' "9143
Often the language used by the parties is sufficient in itself for the
Board to reach a conclusion as to this factor. For example, in Seattle-
First National Bank,'44 the Board noted that the contemporaneous un-
derstandings of the parties supported an impasse finding because the
union had asserted that the employer's proposals "were so onerous that
the Union 'could clearly never accept them.' ",45 However, mere use of
the word "impasse" by the parties during negotiations is usually insuffi-
cient to establish a contemporaneous understanding that the state of ne-
gotiations had reached the point of futility.' 46
The Bell Transit147 case is once again instructive as an example of
the extent to which the reasoning in cases following the more recent view
141. Id. at 768.
142. Id. A number of cases have stated this standard as the means by which the "contemporane-
ous understandings of the parties" factor is to be applied. See SGS Control Serys., Inc., 275
N.L.R.B. 984, 987 (1985) ("I find that at no time material herein was Respondent justified in assum-
ing that further bargaining would have been futile, a standard the Board has cited in conjunction
with the Taft Broadcasting factors."); Saunders House, 265 N.L.R.B. 1632, 1634 (1982) ("The final
factor here, the contemporaneous understanding of the parties, is conclusive. It is well settled that
for impasse to be found the parties must have reached 'that point of time in negotiations when the
parties are warranted in assuming that further bargaining would be futile.' ") (quoting Patrick &
Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 390, 393 (1980)); Alsey Refractories Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 785, 785 n.1 (1974)
(Board stated its belief that the correct standard was whether the parties were warranted in assuming
that further bargaining would have been futile).
143. 252 N.L.R.B. at 768 (quoting NLRB v. Webb Furniture Corp., 366 F.2d 314, 316 (4th Cir.
1966)).
144. 267 N.L.R.B. 897 (1983).
145. Id. at 898 (footnote omitted) (quoting Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 241 N.L.R.B. 753, 755
(1979)).
146. T. Marshall Corp., 279 N.L.R.B. No. 166, slip op. at 4 (May 27, 1986) ("The record in this
proceeding does not establish that an impasse existed. The fact that Respondent's witness stated that
the May 1981 proposal constituted an 'impasse offer' is not sufficient to establish the existence of
impasse."); Saunders House, 265 N.L.R.B. 1632, 1633 (1982) ("The union negotiator presented a
series of union proposals intending to end what he described as an 'impasse.' " (footnote omitted)).
As to the use of the word impasse, the Board stated: "We are unconvinced given the bargaining
posture of the union that the term was used with legal precision." Id. at 1633 n.3.
147. See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
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will justify an impasse finding based on economic necessity by explaining
away factors designed to make a determination of bargaining futility. In
Bell Transit, the Board affirmed adherence to the Taft factors and had
based its impasse finding principally on the factor of the "importance of
the issues."' 48 However, in order to reach this result the Board appar-
ently felt compelled to reconcile the "contemporaneous understandings
of the parties" factor with the fact that the employer and union had
reached a tentative agreement at the time the impasse was alleged to have
occurred. 14 9 Thus, the Board held that "[a]n impasse may exist simulta-
neously with a tentative agreement."' 50 The theory was that if the tenta-
tive agreement were ratified, then the impasse would break. On the other
hand, if the tentative agreement were rejected, then the impasse would
endure. 51 The District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the
Board's decision. The court characterized the Board's treatment of this
factor as "irrational," "incomprehensible," and "inconsistent with pre-
vailing law."'
152
It would be an understatement to say that the Board's use of the
"contemporaneous understanding" factor in Bell Transit strayed from
the factor's intended use for determining whether the parties are war-
ranted in their belief that further bargaining would be futile. However,
the case's treatment of this factor, although exaggerated does provide an
example of an effort to construe the impasse doctrine so as to increase the
employer's discretion in bargaining. This increase can only be accom-
plished by applying the Taft factors mechanically without regard to
whether they rationally indicate the presence or absence of futility of fur-
ther bargaining.
IV. SUMMARY
The traditional view of the impasse doctrine is vulnerable to criti-
cism regarding the degree of its effectiveness in promoting the duty to
bargain in the face of a deadlock. However, the recent view of the doc-
trine is more properly criticized as an ideological assault on the very duty
to bargain itself. Analysis of the traditional application of the Taft fac-
tors demonstrates that the impasse doctrine is a less than perfect but still
148. 271 N.L.R.B. at 1273.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1273 n.9.
151. Id.
152. Teamsters Local Union No. 175 v. NLRB, 788 F.2d at 28, 30 (1986). Accord Excavation-
Constr., 248 N.L.R.B. 649, 650 (1980) (employer's assumption that a pending ratification vote was
an empty gesture was rejected because "[s]uch assumptions are not an adequate substitute for collec-
tive bargaining").
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necessary judicial response to the fact that the legislative mandate to en-
force the duty to bargain is limited by the prohibition of compelled agree-
ments. Thus, under the traditional view of the impasse doctrine, each of
the five Taft factors is construed as an indicator of whether further bar-
gaining will be futile. Bargaining history is either applied as an indicator
favoring no impasse when the parties are engaged in an initial bargaining
experience,1 53 or alternatively as an aid to gaining insight into the past
practices of the parties when the bargaining experiences are more exten-
sive. 15 4 The good faith of the parties factor is treated as a prerequisite to
a bona fide impasse. Thus, impasse is usually precluded where the em-
ployer has committed a continuing unremedied unfair labor practice. 155
Further, under the traditional view, the unreasonableness of the bargain-
ing positions taken by the parties may itself serve as an indicator of bad
faith.' 56 The length of negotiations test is applied to determine whether
sufficient opportunity for exhaustive bargaining has occurred. 157 The im-
portance of the issues factor is applied as an indicator of the degree of the
bargaining latitude that existed during negotiations.158 Finally, the con-
temporaneous understandings of the parties factor evaluates the objective
evidence existing at the time of the putative impasse for possible corrobo-
ration of the asserted subjective beliefs of the parties as to the state of the
negotiations. 1
59
In contrast to the traditional view, the more recent view of the im-
passe doctrine amounts to an attack on the strength of the duty to bar-
gain. Once it is established that a particular matter is a mandatory
subject of bargaining, the duty to bargain about that matter would be
terminated whenever the employer can make out a case of compelling
economic necessity. In order to accomplish this objective, advocates of
the more recent view have twisted the impasse doctrine in order to apply
it regardless of whether futility of further negotiations is in fact indicated.
Thus, under the more recent view of the impasse doctrine, the Taft fac-
tors are often applied mechanically or used to conclude that the eco-
nomic necessity of the employer justifies a declaration of a state of
impasse. For example, the bargaining history factor has been applied to
favor finding a state of impasse simply upon the observation that the
153. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
154. See supra text accompanying note 46.
155. See supra text accompanying note 67.
156. See supra text accompanying note 82.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 101-10.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
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parties have had extensive prior bargaining experiences.1 60 Similarly, the
good faith of the parties factor has been held unaffected by the existence
of continuing unremedied unfair labor practices prior to the unilateral
action. 16 ' Further, the unreasonableness of the bargaining proposals has
been considered an invalid indicator of bad faith. 162 In addition, the
length of negotiations factor has been declared noncontrolling 1 63 More-
over, the importance of the issues factor has been equated with the eco-
nomic necessity of the employer.164 Finally, the contemporaneous
understandings of the parties factor has been construed to justify the de-
termination of an impasse during the pendency of a tentative
agreement. 165
Accordingly, it can be concluded that under the recent view of the
impasse doctrine the duty to bargain is construed as a relatively fluid
limitation on the employer's prerogative to undertake unilateral action.
It is fluid in the sense that the employer's economic standing may be
determinative of his duty to bargain. Under this interpretation, the duty
to bargain is improperly subordinated to the economic necessity of the
employer. 166 Essentially, when "impasse" is triggered by the importance
of the issue, justified solely by the economic necessity of the employer,
the duty to bargain is terminated. As a result, the more recent view of
the impasse doctrine contemplates a duty to bargain that is strikingly
weaker than that contemplated by the traditional view.
The traditional view of impasse is predicated on the premise that the
duty to bargain collectively is the framework selected by Congress for the
resolution of industrial disputes. 167 The impasse doctrine is a tool
designed to promote the duty to bargain, not to terminate it. 168
Thus, it is proper that impasse be invoked only when further negoti-
ations really would be futile. Allowance for limited unilateral action at
that point can, in fact, serve the bargaining process in that the condition
giving rise to the stalemate may change and the impasse break. In con-
trast, the role of collective bargaining in the resolution of industrial dis-
putes is decreased by allowing unilateral action based on the economic
necessity of the employer without regard to the futility of further negotia-
160. See supra text accompanying notes 51, 52, 56.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 74-81.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 88-98.
163. See supra text accompanying note 102.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
165. See supra text accompanying note 152.
166. See supra text accompanying note 132.
167. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
168. See supra note 6.
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tions. Under the recent view, the right to collective bargaining with
one's employer is reduced to a privilege of good times.

